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THE SECRET SURRENDER. By Allen Dulles. Harper & Row, 1963. 1 pp. \$3.95.

As director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the successor to the wartime Office of Strategic Services, Allen Dulles was not in a position to write about his best-known intelligence operation of World War II. As it happens, the delay was fortunate, because *The Secret Surrender* comes at a time when the public is almost compulsively interested in espionage, and much more sophisticated about its workings. Moreover, it also raises questions that are pertinent today, for some of Dulles's disclosures provide, perhaps unwittingly, material for the present argument over whether the operations of the C.I.A. are under sufficient government control.

On April 12, 1945, as the war in Europe thundered to a close, President Roosevelt cabled Stalin that "the Berne incident . . . now appears to have faded into the past without having accomplished any useful purpose." Roosevelt did not live long enough to find out that he was wrong: before the sun had set that day, he was dead. "The Berne incident," known to those who engineered it as Operation Sunrise, was the clandestine negotiations carried on in neutral Switzerland and warring Italy that led to the surrender of nearly one million Nazi and Italian Fascist troops in northern Italy on May 2, five days before the final German capitulation.

The delicate and complicated discussions that led to the surrender in Italy were conducted on the Allied side by Allen Dulles, who was senior intelligence agent of the Office of Strategic Services in Switzerland. For the enemy, they were conducted by SS-Obergruppenfuhrer, Karl Wolff.

The first stage of Operation Sunrise came late in February, 1945, when Dulles received word through Major Max Wibel of Swiss intelligence that the Germans in northern Italy had put out a peace feeler. It was by no means the first such report, and Dulles reacted initially with caution. But within a very short time, the path opened by the Swiss major and by an Italian baron, and two lesser SS figures led directly to General Karl Wolff, a favorite of Hitler and former chief of Himmler's personal staff before he became the ranking SS officer in Italy. Wolff slipped into Switzerland and met with Dulles at an O.S.S. apartment in Zurich.

The meeting was only the first in a drama played out in an Alpine setting and against a background of lakeside villas, dreary Swiss railroad stations, and endless Carol Reed-type train rides.

It was typical of the complexity and contradictions of the operation that although Dulles called it "Sunrise," Churchill dubbed it "Crossword." When the Russians were told about "Crossword" on March 21, Stalin went through the roof. He was certain that the Western Allies were trying to make a deal with Hitler behind his back. There followed one of the biggest rows of the war as cables ricocheted back and forth among Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. Under subsequent pressure from Stalin, Truman and apparently Churchill too, decided to halt Operation Sunrise. On April 21, Dulles got a message informing him that

the Joint Chiefs of Staff "directs that O.S.S. break off all contact with German emissaries at once. Dulles is therefore instructed to discontinue immediately all such contacts." To the O.S.S. men in Switzerland, it seemed, at first, the end of the operation, "President Roosevelt had died," Dulles writes, "and it was too much to expect that President Truman could have grasped the significance of Sunrise."

At this crucial period, Wolff was in an Italian villa surrounded by partisans. But Dulles did not close up the operation and accept the decision from above. He stalled, cabling Washington about certain practical considerations he faced; admittedly, he was hoping "I could keep the door open ever so slightly. . . ."

He then called in Gero von S. Gaevernitz, a German-born naturalized American who was his closest collaborator in "Operator Sunrise," though, technically, a private citizen. Dulles explained to Gaevernitz that he himself was under orders not to get in touch with Wolff. Dulles writes that "Gaevernitz listened silently for a moment. Then he said . . . he would like to go on a little trip for a few days. I noticed a twinkle in his eye, and as he told me later, he noticed one in mine . . . I realized of course, what he was going to do, that he intended to do it on his own responsibility." Gaevernitz, of course,

went off and rescued Karl Wolff—and Operation Sunrise. Fortunately for the operators, a week later the Allies reversed the order to Dulles. Wolff's envoys signed the surrender at Caserta two days later. Be that as it may, the operation had already acquired a momentum of its own and not even the President of the United States, who probably did not grasp its significance, could stop it. Dulles and other intelligence professionals have claimed repeatedly that intelligence agencies are strictly of the elected government. But his own account of Sunrise is a devastating argument to the contrary.

If Dulles is silent on this issue, he is also elusive in his treatment of Karl Wolff. Dulles worked vigorously against the Nazis in the O.S.S., and certainly displayed no sympathy for them. But Wolff is portrayed here almost as a sympathetic character.

At the least, we learn that he was "no ogre"; he had, after all, magnanimously assured the Vatican that the Nazis would not kidnap the Pope, and he had promised not to shoot political prisoners held in concentration camps in Italy. And of course there was "his great contribution to the success of the Sunrise operation."

In *The Last 100 Days*, however, John Toland quotes a letter from Wolff to Himmler (signed affectionately "Wolffchen") that tells more about the man than Dulles anywhere revealed: "You personify, not only to me but to the entire Schutzstaffel, all that is good, beautiful and manly . . . All we are today we owe to you and the Fuhrer."

ting his neck in a Nazi noose

by negotiating with Dulles. But it may be asked: with the Third Reich crumbling, did Wolff guess that like his fellow SS general, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, he would be hanged as a war criminal anyway? Was it not at least worth a try to negotiate the Italian surrender and thereby save his own skin? That is how it worked out, up to a point. At the Nuremberg trials, Wolff was a witness for the prosecution. In 1964, however, he was tried and convicted by a West German court for "aiding and abetting murder in at least 300,000 instances." The prosecution said he had supplied boxcars for transporting that number of Jews from Warsaw to the ovens of Auschwitz.

Despite his dubious portrait of Wolff, Dulles tells a fascinating story. There are some Ian Fleming touches—Dulles's O.S.S. code number was not 007 but 110, and there was the plan of one Dulles aide, Captain Tracy Barnes, to parachute into Bolzano with the surrender terms. Sixteen years later, Dulles and Barnes, who is now a senior C.I.A. official, were together in another but less successful secret operation—the Bay of Pigs.

That unhappy operation hastened Dulles's departure to private life after a distinguished career of public service spanning five decades. But it freed him to reminisce, and the nation can, at least, be grateful that Dulles, having come in from the cold, has traded in his cloak and dagger for a pen.

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